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11 Introduction
The debate on illegal migration in the developed world is capturing a great deal
of public attention. The mounting dimension of the phenomenon is a direct con-
sequence of the tightening of immigration laws in most OECD countries. In fact,
instead of decreasing the size of immigration ﬂows, this policy is having the eﬀect
of increasingly shifting the balance from legal to illegal migration.1 In terms of
economic and social impact for both receiving and sending countries this pattern
is far from being neutral. Given the diﬀerent set of incentives and constraints
faced by legal and illegal migrants we might easily expect signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in their migratory behavior. Nevertheless, while there are numerous contributions
in the literature on legal migration, the phenomenon of illegal migration has been
scarcely analyzed, mainly because of the severe lack of data.
In this paper, we aim to shed some light on return migration, and in particular
on return intentions of illegal migrants. Generally, return migration is important
for both the country of origin and the host country. Since return migrants mostly
carry capital, knowledge and entrepreneurship to developing countries, countries of
origin are interested in understanding both the determinants of the return choice
and the individual characteristics of those who decide to return. On the other
hand, in order to establish well-designed immigration policies, the analysis of the
individual behavior of migrants (i.e. getting information on plans and future ex-
pectations) is also essential for destination countries. This is valid for both legal
and illegal migrants; in particular, the latter ones must consider both the possi-
bility of being apprehended, but also the probability of being granted legal status
(e.g. as asylum seeker or via a general amnesty).
Our analysis focuses on illegal migrants for whom illegality is originally designed
in economic terms as a skill waste eﬀect, i.e. a tax that impinges the positive
outcome of skills on both individual income and savings.
Regarding the relationship between skills and return intentions, most literature
has focused on legal migrants. Many studies have emphasized that migrants are
not randomly selected but generally represent the upper tail of the skills distribu-
tion of the population in the countries of origin (see Borjas et al. 1992; Chiswick
2005). Since migration is a particularly costly investment, only the most capable,
entrepreneurial and risk-prone individuals usually undertake such an investment.
1Notwithstanding the statistical diﬃculties in measuring the phenomenon, estimates of illegal
migration (both stocks and ﬂows) are available (see Tapinos (1999) and Jandl (2004) for an
overview of the statistical approaches to measure irregular migration). According to recent
estimates of the INS the total unauthorized immigrant population residing in the United States
in January 2000 was about 7.0 million; from 1990 to 1999 from 350.000 to 500.000 illegal migrants
where crossing the US borders annually. Estimates of illegal migration ﬂows to Europe (EU-15)
in 2001 are up to 650.000 according to a recent study by Jandl (2003), (100.000 of them in Italy).
2The existing empirical research almost unanimously concludes that return mi-
gration is more likely for individuals with low skills and reinforces the positive
self-selection of the migrants (Borjas et al. 1996; Dustmann 1993, 2003a, 2003b;
Reagan and Olsen, 2000). Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) present the only study
on undocumented (i.e. illegal) Mexican immigrants to the US by means of the
data from the Mexican Migration Project. However, their analysis focuses on the
ﬁrst migration choice – i.e. the decision to leave the home country for the ﬁrst
time. Our paper can be considered a sort of complementary study to theirs, which
explicitly does not deal with return migration (see page 220).
The starting point of this paper is the stark diﬀerence between irregular and
regular migrants. As generally acknowledged, although one of the most common
motives for migration is the necessity to accumulate assets (which will be sub-
sequently employed in productive activities) an illegal entrant is generally less
capable to fully exploit his or her skills and human capital. Moreover, the illegal
status hinders the migrant’s access to many markets and institutions in the host
country (including ﬁnancial markets), which are instead fully available to legal
migrants. Being illegal may make individual skills even less eﬀective than in the
home country, as the illegal migrant has to resort uniquely to the shadow economy.
As a consequence, the skill waste eﬀect, typically related to the illegal status, is
particularly strong for those who are the most skilled and educated among the
illegal entrants. Given this, it would be natural to expect that the opportunity
cost of returning to the country of origin be substantially lower for the skilled
individuals than for the unskilled ones.
First, we consider the life-cycle framework to link the skill endowment to the
return decision of illegal migrants. Second, thanks to the availability of an unique
data set on Italian irregular immigrants we empirically test the main implications
of our theoretical speciﬁcation.
In particular, the data set comprehends a sample of 920 illegal migrants who
crossed the Italian borders in 2003. One of the most important features of these
data is that they contain information on the migrants’ expectations “at the gate”
concerning their intentions to return, together with many other characteristics
(e.g. intentions to remit, expectations on future income, employment, legal status,
characteristics of the village of origin etc.). Indeed, using this data set we are able
to quantify the eﬀects of skills and education and other relevant variables on the
return intention.
Empirical results conﬁrm the main ﬁndings of our theoretical model and, in
particular, they highlight the important role of individual skills in increasing the
choice of return for illegal migrants.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst contribution towards increasing
our knowledge on the relationship between skill characteristics and return attitudes
3for illegal migrants, whose numbers far outpace those of legal migrants.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main characteristics
of the data set on Italian irregular immigrants. Section 3 presents a theoretical
(life-cycle) framework to model the return plans of irregular migrants with hetero-
geneous level of skills. Section 4 reports and discusses the results of the empirical
analysis. Lastly, Section 5 concludes with some general remarks and suggestions
for further research.
2 Irregular Migration: Some Background and
the Italian Individual Data
The phenomenon of international migration seems to have undertaken relevant
changes in the latter decades, especially in Europe. The ﬂows of legal and docu-
mented migrants have been accompanied by a surge in irregular migrants. This
can be related to the restrictive changes in migration policies occurred in most
OECD countries since the mid-1970s (see Zimmermann, 1995, Faini, de Melo and
Zimmermann, 1999, Venturini, 2003).
More precisely, the deﬁnition of irregular immigrant is strictly related to three
characteristics of the international movement of people and labor force: the type
of entry, the status of residence, the kind of work permit (see Tapinos, 1999).
For instance, an alien that has legally entered the host country and has acquired
legal residence, but no work permit, is considered an irregular migrant if he or she
works.2
In 2003 the Department of Economics at the University of Bari has conducted
a ﬁeld survey – SIMI, Survey of Illegal Migration in Italy – by focusing on some
speciﬁc types of illegal immigrants. Referring to the deﬁnition above, the survey
was directed on migrants that failed all three legal requirements (entry, residence
and work permit). In particular, the survey took advantage of the Italian law
that prescribed apprehended illegal aliens to be hosted in special residence centers
(Centers of Temporary Residence or Centri di Permanenza Temporanea) to ascer-
tain their identiﬁcation. According to the law, this stay could be extended up to
2There is a major diﬀerence between countries more immigration-prone – like the US and
Canada – and more closed countries – like the European Union after 1970s. In the former ones
the visa system is very stratiﬁed and allows a more clear identiﬁcation of the three layers (entry,
residence and employment). This has a consequence also on the type of illegal immigration. For
instance, the common situation of a migrant that overstays his legal visit (and residence) in the
US while waiting for a legal work permit has no counterpart in Europe, but in the rare cases
of amnesties since the issue of work permits (i.e. the legalization of employment , diﬀerently
from entry and residence) is not clearly regulated. Then, the diﬀerent attitudes towards legal
migration have consequences also on the type of illegal migration, being less socially compatible
in the closed countries rather than in the immigration-prone countries.
4thirty days when there were no bilateral agreements with the country of origin to
allow quick repatriation.
The ﬁeld survey was mainly conducted in the host temporary centers, although
some migrants were also interviewed at other aggregation places (public canteens,
help and reception centers). The data were collected by means of questionnaires
ﬁlled up by each individual with the help of an interviewer (usually a cultural
mediator trusted by the migrants and previously trained on the questionnaire and
its scientiﬁc aims).3
The survey aimed at collecting individual data on “illegal immigrants”, more
speciﬁcally their main demographic and socio-economic characteristics, as well as
their motivations and future expectations from the (at least temporarily aborted)
migration project.
To be more precise, by “illegal immigrant” (i.e. the sampling unit) SIMI deﬁnes
a (at least 18-year old) clandestine or asylum seeker that has been in Italy for a
period no longer than 6 months.4 This short period minimizes the measurement
error when interviewees were asked to recall previous events. One of the aims of
the survey was to obtain an accurate recollection of earnings and expenditures
before migration, as well as future expectations before departure.
The sample included 920 individuals that were interviewed in the period January–
September 2003 in four border Italian regions (mainly concerned with the phenom-
enon of illegal entrance).5 The total number of individuals interviewed represented
10.82% of all the 8,502 illegal migrants that were hosted in the selected centers in
the same period January–September 2003.
55 diﬀerent nationalities have been represented in the sample; the six largest
fractions were coming from: Iraq (9.6%), Liberia (9%), Sudan (5.4%), Morocco
(5.1%), Senegal (4.8%), Turkey (4.8%).
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the sample that are more relevant
for the present paper.
According to our data, the average illegal migrant entering Italy is young (about
27 years old). The declared family monthly income in the country of origin was
on average around 218 USD (while average individual monthly income was 145$),
with a very high variability due to the extreme heterogeneity of the socio-economic
conditions of the interviewees. It is noteworthy that interviewees, once settled
down in the country of ﬁnal destination, expected to earn an average monthly
wage of 877 USD.
3For further details on the ﬁeld survey see Chiuri, et al. (2004); for the statistical and
methodological issues related to sampling see Chiuri and D’Uggento (2004).
4See Appendix D for a thorough deﬁnition.
5The four regions are: Apulia, Calabria, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Sicily.
5Table 1: Main Characteristics of the 2003 Survey on Illegal
Migration in Italy (SIMI).
General
Number of sample units 920
Median Age 27.2 (6.19)
Family income at home (in US$) 851.13 (1048.9)
Expected income at destination (in US$) 3675.86 (4153.2)
Number of children 0.57 (1.09)
children left home 0.45 (0.95)
Cost of the trip (in US$) 1644.95 (1417.18)
Intention to return home 0.59 (0.49)
Intended length of stay 3.86 (1.27)
Sample composition
Clandestines (percentage) 29.8




School degree 2.87 (1.33)
primary (percentage) 27.08
middle (percentage) 30.85
high-school (percentage ) 21.75
university (percentage) 4.99
Good host-country language proﬁciencya 20.22




a Percentage of migrants with declared good proﬁency (“basic”
level through “very good” level) in the language of the intended
destination country.
b High-skilled qualiﬁcation is considered for the following (de-
clared) jobs before migration: translator, secretary, ﬁnancial ad-
visor, doctor or chemist, lawyer, teacher, manager, consultant,
entrepreneur.
6Migration is a major investment for the family: on average the cost of the
trip is equivalent to approximately 2 years of individual earnings in the country of
origin.
About 60% of the interviewees declared to have intentions to return home and
our empirical analysis is based on their characteristics in order to determine which
variables aﬀect more the decision to return home.
One third of the individuals in the sample are clandestine. There is a high
percentage of asylum seekers in. The two typologies diﬀer in many aspects. The
more relevant for our analysis is that asylum seekers, given their special status,
have a much higher probability of getting legal status with respect to clandestine
immigrants.
Illegal immigrants into SIMI have a non-negligible level of skills that we mea-
sure in three diﬀerent ways. First, the degree of illiteracy is not very high since
only 13.2% declared they cannot read and write. In terms of schooling, 5% of
the migrants in the sample have a University degree while 13.9% and 7.9% have
respectively a secondary education degree and vocational education. Only 15.3%
of the sample declares to have no formal education. Other two indirect measures
of skills are represented by the degree of host-country language proﬁciency and
by the type of declared job qualiﬁcation. Over a quarter of the migrants has a
basic knowledge of the destination country’s language and another 20% of the mi-
grants declare to have a good knowledge of it. A signiﬁcative share of the migrants
(18.2%) can be classiﬁed as high-skilled on the basis of the job qualiﬁcations in
the country of origin, although the majority of the migrants are low-skilled.
In the following section we propose some theoretical considerations to link
return decisions of illegal migrants and their skill endowments within a very simple
life-cycle framework.
3 Skills and Return Decisions of Irregular Mi-
grants: A Simple Life-Cycle Interpretation
The main point of our paper is that the eﬀect of illegality dampens the return on
skills of immigrants; hence, it provides a higher incentive to return home to the
high-skilled migrants rather than to the low-skilled ones.
It can be given a very simple life-cycle interpretation of this intuition. Let
us consider a two-period discrete world where the utility function of the illegal
migrant takes the usual logarithmic form:
U = ln(C1) + δ ln(C2) (1)
C1 and C2 are consumption in period 1 and period 2 respectively; δ is the
7subjective discount factor.




wB is the average wage in the destination country B; a is the migrant skill level
and we assume that migrants’ skills are continuously distributed over the interval
[a,a]. Finally, τ ∈ (0,1] captures the magnitude of the skill waste eﬀect associated
with the status of illegal migrant. As τ → 0 illegal migration tends to be less
and less rewarding for all illegal migrants and has a squeezing eﬀect on the level
of human capital, i.e. being uneducated and unskilled rather than having a PhD
in engineering does not change the returns from migration.6 On the contrary,
when τ = 1 there is no skill waste and migrants’ human capital is fully rewarded
according to the skill content a.
Income in period 2 depends on what the illegal immigrant decides at the end of
period 1, whether to go back home to country A or stay in the destination country
B where there is a nonzero probability of becoming legal.
In case of return, in period 2 the migrant will be able to be fully rewarded for
his/her skills and no illegality skill-waste eﬀect takes place, but in the origin coun-
try A the average wage wA is lower than in the destination country. Summarizing,





If the illegal migrant decides to stay in the country of destination B, he/she
will face a probability γ of getting legal status and therefore to fully exploit his/her
skills in the labor market. Hence, the expected wage for period 2 in case of no




B + (1 − γ)aτw
B
since the wage will be awB (without skill waste) with probability γ of obtain-
ing legal status, aτwB, like in period 1, if he/she does not get legal status with
probability (1 − γ).






6Even if τ = 0 is implausible since the brightest and more skilled migrants are more likely to
obtain the best opportunities, skills and formal qualiﬁcation are of little use to an illegal migrant.
Very often migrants employed illegally in highly unskilled and manual jobs – such as agricultural
workers in developed countries – are highly skilled and educated individuals.
8where h ≡ γ + (1 − γ)τ.
One ﬁnal important consideration regards the use of ﬁnancial markets to carry
savings from period 1 to period 2. Let us deﬁne Rj ≡ (1+rj) as the rate of return
for country j.
We assume that the rate of return of the illegal migrant is aﬀected by both
his/her skills and the illegal status. In other words, at the end of period 1 if the
migrant decides to return home (country A), then it will invest his/her savings in
the origin country and obtain a rate of return equal to aRA. We are implicitely
assuming that at the end of period 1 the illegal migrant is repatriating his/her
savings and the rate of return he/she will obtain be proportional to her skills.
Indeed, empirical studies and surveys on return migration have shown that the
repatriation of funds is likely to start entrepeneurial activities whose rate of return
are not ﬁxed and will depend on individual abilities.
In case of no return, we assume that the illegal migrant uses the destination
country B ﬁnancial markets to invest his/her savings. Once again, the rate of
return will depend on personal skills, but they are dampened by illegality through
the skill waste eﬀect: aτRB.
Let us assume that the “normal” rate of return are not diﬀerent in the two
countries, i.e. RA = RB = R.7 This assumption will simplify the framework and
allow for a simple graphical interpretation.
Summarizing, the problem of the illegal migrant is to maximize his/her utility
U of eq. (1) under two diﬀerent budget constraints depending on whether returning
to the home country A or staying in the destination country B. In case of return




















In Figure 1 the continuous budget constraints are drawn under the assumption
that neither return nor “no return” are revealed-preferred, i.e. that the two budget
constraints intersect in the ﬁrst quadrant.8
Moreover, since the budget lines change for diﬀerent values of skills, we con-
sidered the special skill level a∗ for which utility in case of return and “no return”
7See the Appendix A for a generalization of the model with two diﬀerent rates of return.
8Since the slope of the “no return” (NR) budget constraint is lower than in the case of return,
then it suﬃces to show that the intercept the the NR budget constraint, i.e. C
NR
1 , is higher than
the intercept of the budget constraint in case of return, i.e. C
R





































Figure 1: The welfare eﬀect of skill variation in both cases of return and no return.
10is the same and equal to U(a∗), as indicated by the indiﬀerence curve reported in
the graph.
When we consider an individual with a skill level a0 > a∗, the new budget
constraints will tilt and move outwards, as shown in the Figure 1 by the dashed
lines. The movement outwards is due to the increase in life-cycle income, whereas
the tilting is caused by the fact that the rates of return depend on the individual
skill level. However, since in case of “no return” the rate of return is reduced by
the skill waste eﬀect, the tilting will be lower.
It can be formally shown that the new intertemporal bundles E0
R and E0
NR will
not lay on the same indiﬀerence curves and the return option will be chosen since
it assures a higher welfare.9
In both cases of return and “no return” the increase in the skill level induces
both a substitution and an income eﬀect. The latter one is the same, as also
shown by the horizontal increase in the intercepts. Instead, the substitution eﬀect
is higher in case of return because of the (absence of the) skill waste eﬀect.
One last eﬀect is due to the change in the probability of obtaining legal sta-
tus, γ. When this probability increases, the budget constraint of “no return”
only moves up and, as obvious, the illegal migrant is better oﬀ in staying in the
destination country.
In the following section we test these two implications of the life-cycle approach
by means of the data from SIMI.
4 Empirical Analysis
In order to test the main implications of our theoretical model, we implement a
probit model on the intentions to return (i.e. the dependent variable is equal to
1 if the individual expects to return home, zero otherwise). Deﬁnitions and basic
statistics of the explanatory variables are presented in Appendix E.
Following the theoretical framework presented in Section 3, the main objective
of this empirical analysis is to test whether the choice of returning home of an
individual that has illegally migrated is inﬂuenced by his or her skills (parameter
aj).
Here, we measure individual skills by means of three diﬀerent variables: years
of schooling, individual skills and qualiﬁcations and proﬁciency of the language of
the intended country of destination. In accordance with Section 3, for the more
skilled migrants the skill waste eﬀect associated with the status of illegal migrant
increases the opportunity cost of continuing to reside illegally in the destination
country. Thus, we expect variables measuring high skills to have a positive eﬀect
on the probability of returning in the country of origin.
9See the Appendix A for a formal proof.
11Moreover, we proxy for the diﬀerent probability of being granted legal status
using a dummy for clandestine. Generally speaking, illegal immigrants may be
divided into two broad categories: asylum seekers and clandestine immigrants.
Asylum seekers are motivated to notify their presence to the authorities of the
receiving country, whereas clandestine immigrants shy away from oﬃcial contacts
and tend to live working quietly, waiting for the next amnesty which will make
them legal migrants. The probability of being granted legal status, while positive
for both categories of migrants, is generally higher for asylum seekers. Since being
legal increases the ability of migrants to fully employ in the country of destination
her human and ﬁnancial capital, we expect the eﬀect of clandestine to be positive
on the propensity to return.
The willingness to return home also depends on expected economic opportu-
nities in the country of origin (i.e. the “normal” wage wA in model, or negatively
the wage gap b w as shown thoroughly in the Appendix A). Return migration will
be generally higher in countries that are at an intermediate level of development
and would oﬀer opportunities to migrants who have accumulated human and ﬁ-
nancial capital. For this reason, we introduce two variables for infrastructure in
the country of origin, which are both expected to have a positive eﬀect on return:
infrastructure (macro) that measures the relative endowment of infrastructure at
the country level and infrastructure (micro) that is a proxy for individual access
to basic infrastructures at the level of the village/city of origin. Expectations on
future opportunities in the country of origin are also inﬂuenced by previous job
experiences in the country of origin. Thus, we include a dummy variable for unem-
ployed in the home country before migrating, which is expected to have a negative
inﬂuence on the probability of returning.
Moreover, illegal migrants might also ﬁnd better employment opportunities
via migrants already established in the country of destination. In fact, those
individuals might provide the newcomers with information about labor market
opportunities and increase their probability of acceding to better-paid and stable
jobs. In order to capture this eﬀect, we include a dummy for migration network
(migronetwork). In terms of our theoretical model, the existence of a network
improves the ability of illegals to ﬁnd a job. Therefore, we expect migronetwork
to have a negative eﬀect on the probability of return.
In order to have a complete empirical speciﬁcation, we also introduce few vari-
ables that control for the other factors that might aﬀect the choice of returning.
In fact, together with business and entrepreneurial motivations, one might decide
to return to the country of origin because of family and cultural ties [see Dust-
mann (2003a)].10 We therefore include a number of proxies that give a measure
10More broadly these factors might also proxy for the psychic cost of migration and may enter
our model as a ﬁxed disutility ﬂow for each period the migrant is far away from the family. An
12of the intensity of family ties, such as number of children, children in the destina-
tion countries and relatives left at home. These are expected to have a positive,
negative and positive eﬀect on the return choice, respectively.11
As far as cultural ties with the country of origin are concerned, it is widely
accepted that the costs of residing in a foreign country increase with the degree of
cultural and social diversity between the origin and destination countries. A dif-
ferent religion is one important dimension on which such diversities are expressed.
Hence, we include a dummy variable, Muslim, that aims to capture the, generally
greater, psychological cost of migration faced by individuals of Islamic religion,
and this is supposed to have a positive eﬀect on the return choice. Along the same
line, we include the (log of) geographical distance as a proxy for the monetary
and psychological cost of migration (when distance is short migrants can aﬀord
frequent journeys back home) and previous migration experience, given that previ-
ous moves generally lower the non-monetary and psychological costs of subsequent
migrations. These variables are expected to have a positive and negative eﬀect on
the return choice, respectively.
Aside from our theoretical model, the peculiarity of our dataset also allows
us to analyze the eﬀect of social conﬂict and ﬁnancial or economic crisis in the
village/city of origin on the choice of return.12 These events might have profound
and diﬀerent implications on the intentions to return. In fact, while social conﬂicts
or civil wars might have a permanent eﬀect on migration, economic or ﬁnancial
crisis might lead to a temporary out-migration which might be subsequently re-
absorbed when economic conditions improve again.
Along a similar line of thinking, we control for the eﬀects on return intentions of
belonging to a minority religious and ethnic group in the home country. Minority
groups in many countries of origin, which are represented in our sample, suﬀer
from discrimination and sometimes violent persecutions. Hence, in our analysis
we include an interaction eﬀect between a dummy variable minority and an index
of ethnic polarization, which aims to capture potential conﬂicts and concentration
of power “outside” the minority. This index ranges from 0 to 1 and polarization
reaches a maximum when there are two religious/ethnic groups of equal size.13 As
a matter of construction, this variable is expected to have a negative eﬀect on the
extension of the model of Section ?? is straightforward and is available from the authors upon
request.
11See Dustmann (2003a) who highlights the importance of children in shaping parents’ return
decision.
12In terms of our model, they may be related once more to the “normal” wage in the country
of origin wA or negatively to the wage gap b w, although the two variables will prove to have a
diﬀerent eﬀect among each other.
13For recent analysis concerned with the eﬀects of religious and ethnic polarization on economic
development see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003, 2004).
13probability of return.
Finally, we include a macro area dummy in order to capture the characteristics
of the geographical areas of origin that are not observable.14
Table 2 and 3 show the estimates and the relative marginal eﬀects, respectively.
Although we present the results of diﬀerent speciﬁcations in what follows we only
comment on the most completed one (Model 4).15
Table 2: Estimates of the Probit Model: Diﬀerent Spec-
iﬁcations
Regressors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Years of sch. 0.110∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.100∗∗
(0.036) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046)
Host-c. lang. prof. 0.514∗∗ 0.399∗∗ 0.312∗∗ 0.294∗∗
(0.089) (0.104) (0.112) (0.112)






Infrastr. (micro) 0.216∗ 0.249∗ 0.248∗
(0.122) (0.128) (0.128)
Infrastr. (micro) 0.287∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.438∗∗
(0.153) (0.164) (0.165)
Unemployed at home −0.199∗∗ −0.219∗∗ −0.227∗∗
(0.102) (0.107) (0.108)
Social conﬂict −0.399∗∗ −0.285∗∗ −0.292∗∗
(0.127) (0.140) (0.140)
Economic crisis 0.566∗∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.588∗∗
(0.148) (0.158) (0.159)
Minority*eth. pol. −0.376∗∗ −0.323∗∗ −0.298∗
(0.149) (0.158) (0.159)
N. of children 0.136∗∗ 0.145∗∗ 0.143∗∗
(0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Children in host c. −0.498∗∗ −0.446∗ −0.45∗
(0.223) (0.242) (0.243)
continued on next page
14The limited number of observations together with the large number of countries in our dataset
does not allow us to use country dummies.
15Other speciﬁcations are also available from the authors upon request.
14Table 2: continued
Regressors Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Relatives at home 0.043∗∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.042∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Past migration −0.307∗∗ −0.23∗∗ −0.251∗∗
(0.109) (0.114) (0.115)
Distance(in log) 0.427∗∗ 0.535∗∗ 0.531∗∗
(0.128) (0.137) (0.137)
Muslim 0.304∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.368∗∗
(0.107) (0.115) (0.115)
Asia −0.830∗∗ −0.794∗∗ −0.807∗∗
(0.218) (0.231) (0.231)
Africa (excl North) −0.522∗∗ −0.406∗ −0.41∗
(0.217) (0.235) (0.235)
America −0.628 −0.737 −0.684
(0.683) (0.781) (0.781)
Constant −0.340∗∗ −3.852∗∗ −5.138∗∗ −5.101∗∗
(0.128) (0.955) (1.038) (1.040)
Observations 866 798 752 752
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.144 0.190 0.1932
Log likelihood −556.83 −457.72 −410.56 −408.73
Standard errors in parentheses / Probability of return (baseline) = 0.633
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%
Table 3: Marginal Eﬀects of Model (4)
Regressors Marg. Eﬀ. Prob. (1)
Years of schooling 0.038∗∗ 0.046
(0.017)
Host-country lang. proﬁciency 0.110∗∗
(0.041)








continued on next page
15Table 3: continued
Regressors Marg. Eﬀ. Prob. (1)
Infrastracture (macro) 0.154∗∗
(0.053)






Minority*ethnic polarization index −0.112∗ -0.037
(0.06)
N. of children 0.054∗∗ 0.06
(0.019)
Children in the destination country −0.176∗∗
(0.096)














Probability of return (baseline) = 0.633
(1) change in predicted probability as X changes of one
standard deviation centered around the mean value
Standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%
Results are generally in line with our expectations. Skills and education signif-
icantly increase the probability of return to the home country. The probability of
return of a relatively skilled person is 9.7% higher than the probability of return of
an individual with no or low skills. Individuals with the lowest level of education
16in the sample are 15% less likely to return than individuals with a higher level.
Also, the knowledge of the language of the intended destination countries increases
the likelihood to return by 11%.
These ﬁndings contrast with most existing studies on return migration and
return intentions of legal migrants. Dustmann (1996, 2003b) using data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel ﬁnds a negative eﬀect of year of schooling on
the intention to return in the home country. However, the author ﬁnds that for
those who intend to return, schooling has a negative impact on the duration of
the migration spell. In relation to this last result, Dustmann’s explanation is that
higher schooling, by guaranteeing higher salary, reduces the time needed to achieve
a pre-determined saving target. In a related study on the factors which aﬀect the
return migration of a cohort of foreign-born in the US, Reagan and Olsen (2000)
ﬁnd no evidence of skill bias in return migration. On the other hand, our results
are in line with Zhao (2002)’s. In his analysis on rural to urban migration in China,
the author ﬁnds that better educated and skilled rural migrants are more likely
to return to their village of origin. The explanation oﬀered by the author ﬁts our
interpretation: both the strong labor segmentation in the urban labor market and
the tight migration regulatory system in China prevent the full participation of
skilled workers from rural area. This imposes heavy costs on skilled migrants in
terms of rewards to education and work experience.
As expected, the coeﬃcient on the dummy for clandestine is positive and highly
signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on migration network is signiﬁcant and positive; this
might be due to the fact that the existence of established networks relatively
reduces the risks associated with the migratory experience.
Illegal migrants are also found to be more willing to return in countries that
are relatively more developed.16 Countries that have an above average level of
infrastructures (as measured by the dummy infrastructure (macro) are 15% more
likely to attract migrants back home. As well, migrants who have declared to have
access to electricity and/or drinkable water in their home are 9.5% more likely to
return [infrastructure (micro)].17 As was to be expected, we ﬁnd that individuals
who were unemployed back home are signiﬁcantly less likely to return.
Most control variables have the expected sign. For instance, we ﬁnd evidence
of the importance of family and cultural ties. In our estimations, an individual
with two children left in the home country is 16.8 percentage points more likely
to return than in the case where the children were already in the country of desti-
nation. Also the size of the family left in the country of origin signiﬁcantly aﬀect
return intentions. Our evidence is in conformity with Dustmann (2003a) where
16Let us recall that Proposition 2 in the Appendix underlines that all illegal migrants will go
back home when the wage gap is lower than the rate-of-return gap.
17This variable might also be interpret as the level of relative deprivation of individuals in the
home country.
17the presence of children in the host country negatively aﬀects the return intention
of parents.
As expected, past migration experience reduces the probability of return plans.
Also, the coeﬃcients on the proxies for monetary and psychic cost of migration,
namely distance and muslim, are signiﬁcant and positive, respectively. Finally, we
ﬁnd that illegal migrants from European and North African countries are more
likely to return than those coming from other countries.
Interestingly we also acknowledge that social conﬂicts and economic crisis have
opposite eﬀects on the return choice. The eﬀect of having experienced an economic
or ﬁnancial crisis in the village of origin seems to be temporary whereas social
conﬂicts have a more permanent eﬀect on migration.18
5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we assumed that the status of illegal migrant hinders the full utiliza-
tion of individual skills. As a consequence, the opportunity cost of returning home
is lower for highly skilled migrants rather than individuals with few or no skills.
This result has been proved both theoretically and empirically. A simple two-
period model with skill waste eﬀect has shown that the return choice is more likely
for individuals with more abilities. A higher probability of being granted legal
status (as it is for asylum seekers rather than clandestine immigrants) decreases
the probability of returning home.
Empirical estimates of a probit model on the intentions to return home have
been obtained on a sample of 920 illegal immigrants hosted in Italian centers. The
employed measure of individual skills (years of schooling, host-country language
proﬁciency, level of skill of job at home) aﬀect the intentions to return home in
the predicted direction. Other control variables prove the validity of the empirical
model.
Since migration ﬂows have proved to be unavoidable, the main message of
this paper pinpoints the need to carefully design new immigration policies. In
particular, it ought to be considered that a generic ban is not neutral and gives
greater incentives to the more skilled workers to return home rather than to the
low-skill migrants. An analysis of welfare considerations for both the host and
the home country would of course require a much richer theoretical model, that
would include the eﬀects of new entrants on the host labor markets, a multi-
18We note this ﬁnding conﬁrms the importance of a coordinated, timely and eﬃcient inter-
national conﬂict prevention activity. Also migrants belonging to a religious or ethnic minority
in the country of origin are less likely to return: the probability of remaining in the destination
country is increasing in the degree of religious polarization (i.e. the higher is potential hostility
faced by a religious minority in the country of origin). See Chiuri et al. (2003).
18period framework and the possible interactions among natives, legal and illegal
immigrants. Another important extension of the model would regard the length
of stay in the host country and whether this may also depend on the individual’s
skills and the degree of illegality. All these extensions may be the task of future
work.
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20APPENDIX
A The model
Consider a population of illegal migrants with a heterogeneous level of skills from
the same source country A who have migrated to the host country B. Migrants’
skills are continuously distributed over an interval [a,a] where a and ¯ a represent
respectively the individuals with the lowest and the highest skill level.
Individuals operate in a two-period world and are endowed with a unit of labor
which is inelastically supplied in each of the two periods.19
The migrants’ intertemporal utility function is deﬁned over ﬁrst- and second-
period consumption and takes the following simple form:
U (c1,c2) = u(c1) + δu(c2) = ln(c1) + δ ln(c2)
where δ is the discount factor.
In the ﬁrst period individuals live and work in the host country B. Consump-









1 is the ﬁrst-period wage when working illegally in country B and sj are
savings.
Given their status of illegal migrants in the host country B the rewards to
human capital cannot be fully exploited: income earned in country B is increasing
in the skill level but we assume that the skill premium is compressed because of






where wB is the exogenously given “normal” wage for a unit of labor in the host
country.
Individual wages positively depend on individual skills but the status of illegal
migrant makes those skills less eﬀective. The parameter τ ∈ (0,1] captures the
magnitude of the skill waste eﬀect associated with the status of illegal migrant. As
τ → 0 illegal migration tends to be less and less rewarding for all illegal migrants
and has a squeezing eﬀect on the level of human capital, i.e. being uneducated and
unskilled rather than having a PhD in engineering does not change the returns from
19We assume that the individual possesses no capital at the beginning of the ﬁrst period. In
reality, it is often the case that migrants from less developed countries have a negative amount
of wealth since they have borrowed from friends and relatives in order to pay for migration costs.
21migration.20 On the contrary, when τ = 1 there is no skill waste and migrants’
human capital is fully rewarded according to the skill content aj.21In other words,
when τ = 1 we assume that migration is legalized.
The parameter τ might be interpreted as the eﬀect of the institutional frame-
work within which illegal migration takes place on the individual’s ability to use
the stock of human capital accumulated at home. The degree to which it is possi-
ble for the migrant to exploit his or her skills might depend, for instance, on the
attitude of the immigration authorities in the host country. When some particular
skills are required due to an excess demand in the host country labor market, im-
migration authorities tend to be more tolerant toward illegal migrants possessing
those skills (in this case τ may be close to 1).
In the second period migrants face two options. They can return to the home
country A, where the exogenously given “normal” wage is wA (< wB). In this case
they fully use their skills and earn ajwA. Alternatively, they continue to reside
in the host country B where they face a positive probability of becoming legal
migrants and therefore fully exploit their human capital.
The skill waste aﬀects also the ability of illegal migrants to fully exploit ﬁnancial
markets in the host country and therefore the return on savings, which diﬀers
depending on the migrant’s choice for the second period.
Often the sole motive for migration is the necessity to accumulate assets that
will be subsequently employed in productive activities at home. Here we assume
that if the migrant decides to go back to homeland A in period 2, then period-1
savings will be directly used, together with individual skills, in an entrepreneurial
project with gross return ajRA in the home country A — where RA is the exoge-
nously given “normal” gross return on savings in the home country. We allow for
returns from the entrepreneurial project to diﬀer between migrants. The higher
the level of skills of the migrant, the higher the likelihood that she will locate
20Even if τ = 0 is implausible since the brightest and more skilled migrants are more likely to
obtain the best opportunities, skills and formal qualiﬁcation are of little use if you are an illegal
migrant. Very often migrants employed illegally in highly unskilled and manual jobs – such as
agricultural workers in developed countries – are highly skilled and educated individuals.
21Since all individuals found it proﬁtable to migrate at the beginning of the ﬁrst period and
given that we abstract from diﬀerences in preferences for the location of consumption (associated
for instance with relatively high preferences for home consumption) for any aj ∈ [a,a] the
following inequality is satisﬁed:
τajwB ≥ ajwA =⇒ τwB − wA ≥ 0
where wA  
< wB
is the exogenously given “normal” wage for a unit of labor in the home country.
In other words wage diﬀerentials more that compensate for the “skill waste” eﬀect. Moreover,
since we assume that illegal migrants have already chosen to live and work in the host country
B in period 1, the condition above imposes either a lower bound to the percentage wage gap
b w ≡ w
B
wA (i.e. b w > 1
τ ) or, given wA and wB, a lower bound to τ (i.e. τ > w
A
wB).
22the best investment opportunities and, in turn, the more rewarding will be the
allocation of her capital.
Similarly, savings are located in the host country B in case the migrant decides
to stay in B during period 2. The exogenously given “normal” return on savings
in B is RB. Then, in case of a period-2 stay in country B, savings generate a
return τajRB, which is higher for individuals with higher skills, but is aﬀected by
the skill waste.
Hence, the return from savings will vary according to the migrant’s location










if he or she returns to country A
if he or she stays in country B
In other words, illegal migrants face constraints which negatively aﬀect not
only their ability to fully exploit their labor potential but also their ability to
locate and exploit investment opportunities. For instance, although fully aware of
the diﬀerent ﬁnancial opportunities oﬀered in the host country, the illegal migrant
does not have access to them since she does not have a legal permit and must recur
to alternative, less rewarding and sometimes illegal, forms of ﬁnancial investment.
Instead, when planning to go back to the homeland, migrants immediately send
home their savings, where they start their entrepreneurial project even before
returning.
Therefore, consumption in second period also diﬀers depending on the mi-



















where in the home country return migrants are fully able to exploit their human
capital as related to both their endowment of labor and the capital saved in the
host country.
If migrants decide to stay in the host country they face a positive probability of
getting legal residence. For instance, this might happen in the case of an amnesty
granted to all illegal migrants who have being residing and working for a certain
period in the host country or in the case of acceptance of an asylum application.
The main consequence of being granted legal status in terms of our model is the
ability to fully make use of individual skills, i.e. the skill waste eﬀect disappears
in the second period when the migrant obtains the legal status.
Consumption in this case can be expressed as the expected income in period
2 (w
j










NR = g wj,B + e
j
NR (4)
Given γ as the probability of getting legal residence in period 2, then the
expected wage for migrant j in country B in period 2 (g wj,B) will be: (i) τajwB,
i.e. the illegal immigrant’s wage (the same as in period 1) in case of not getting
legal status, with probability (1−γ); (ii) ajwB, i.e. the legal immigrant’s wage in
case of getting legal residence, with probability γ.
Hence, the expected wage for period 2 in case of no-return is:








where h ≡ [(1 − γ)τ + γ] and f wB is the expected “normal” period-2 wage in the
host country B.
When substituting both expected income for period 2 and the return on saving













Finally, the lifetime utilities functions of migrants depend on their decision
whether or not to return. In the case of return:
U
j















Whereas in the case of no return:
U
j














In the following sections we compute the optimal level of savings in both cases
and focus on the relationship between the illegal migrant’s skills level and her
rational decision whether or not to return to the home country.
A.1 Optimal Savings, Return Decisions and Skills
The optimal level of savings s∗j for an individual with skills j is conditional on her
location decision for the second period.
In the case of return migration the level of savings which maximizes the indi-






















If the illegal migrant decides to stay in the host country, then the optimal ﬁrst-
period savings will be determined by the maximization of the utility function (6).






















since f wB ≡ hwB and h ≡ [(1 − γ)τ + γ].
It is easy to show that savings in case of return are higher than saving in case
of no-return when the percentage wage gap between the host country B and the
origin country A — that is b w ≡ wB
wA — is higher than the percentage rate-of-return
gap — that is b R ≡ RB
RA — i.e. when b w > b R.22
Several authors have emphasized that a positive probability of return induces
migrants to save and remit more (see Galor and Stark, 1990; Stark, 1992; Mesnard,
2004). This result is in accordance with the life-cycle theory of consumption since
individuals who plan to re-emigrate in a relatively poor country will save more in
order to smooth their consumption path over the life-cycle.23
By substituting the optimal level of savings (7) and (8) in the respective utility





















A) + δ ln(δa
j) (9)




















B) + δ ln(δa
j) (10)
Let us deﬁne the net indirect utility derived from returning Uj,∗ for an illegal






















[(1 − γ)τ + γ]
Note that the fraction τ
[(1−γ)τ+γ] is always lower than 1 since τ ∈ (0,1].
23Higher incentives to save could also be motivated by a higher marginal utility of consumption
in the home country, for instance due to higher purchasing power in the home country or strong
preferences for home varieties or by the necessity to overcome higher uncertainty (see Dustmann
1997).








which can be rewritten as:
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The discrete choice whether or not to return depends on the sign of the unob-
servable net utility Uj,∗.
Propositions 2 and 3 in the Appendix B show the suﬃcient conditions on wages
and rate of returns such that the sign of Uj,∗ is always negative or always positive,
i.e. such that migrants respectively decide never to return or always to return.
However, such suﬃcient conditions are not easy to satisfy. For instance, in the
special case of equal “normal” rates of returns — RA = RB — the Propositions 2
and 3 never hold when the “normal” wage in the host country is greater than the
“normal” wage in the home country, i.e. wB > wA, which is the most common
case also in reality.
Instead, when migrants are able to circumvent the eﬀect of the skill waste only
in the ﬁnancial markets and rates of return are equalized net of the skill waste —
i.e. RA = τRB — then the decision where to work depends exclusively on the total
ﬂow of income in the two locations. Since the migrant starts in the host country
under both cases, the decision regards only income from period 2. The migrant
decides (not) to return if and only if: wA > f wB (wA < f wB), with no role played
by the individual skills.
Notwithstanding these special instances, in the most general case the two
propositions show that commonly the sign of Uj,∗ is not uniquely deﬁned. Among
all the parameters that denote the sign of the net utility, we pay particular atten-
tion to the skill content, represented by aj.












where WR ≡ RAw
j
1 + wA and WNR = τRBw
j
1 + f wB.
Proposition 1 shows that under general conditions on the relative wages b w and
the relative rates of return b R, a greater number of highly skilled illegal migrants
are more likely to return.
Proposition 1 If the “normal” (percentage) wage gap b w ≡ wB
wA is strictly higher










then, net utility from return migration — therefore the probability of returning in
the home country — is an increasing function of the individual level of skills.
Proof.
See Appendix C
This result is particularly important since it highlights how the eﬀect of illegal-
ity as a skill waste, in both the labor market and the accession of ﬁnancial markets,
induces highly skilled migrants to leave the host country. While our current simple
framework does not allow us to make general inferences regarding overall welfare,
it seems reasonable to assume that illegality costs the host country, as it induces
the more productive individuals to leave ﬁrst.
The net utility is also a decreasing function of the probability of legalization,




(1 + δ)(1 − τ)wB
τRBw
j
1 + f wB
As intuitively expected, better prospects for period 2 increase the expected
income from staying in the host country and reduce the incentives to return.
These latter two results are the main objectives of the empirical analysis, pre-
ceded by a presentation of the data set, in the following sections.
B Suﬃcient Conditions on the Sign of the Net
Utility
Proposition 2 (Suﬃcient conditions for all migrants to stay in the host country B)
No migrant decides to return, i.e. Uj,∗ < 0, if:
(i) the “normal” (percentage) wage gap b w ≡ wB
wA is strictly higher than the “nor-










27(ii) both the “normal” wage and the “normal” rate of return are strictly higher




























































Let us recall that h ≡ [(1 − γ)τ + γ]; hence, the fraction τ
h is certainly lower



















28Let us rewrite the previous condition by employing the wage gap b w and the
rate-of-return gap b R:
R
A b wτa
j (τ b R − 1)
| {z }
[A]




A suﬃcient condition for (15) is that the term [A] is positive and the term [B]
is negative.
This occurs when:






for term [A]; and:






τ, but condition (14) must be satisﬁed for term [1] to be negative,







Proposition 3 (Suﬃcient conditions for all migrants to return the home country A)
All migrants decide to return, i.e. Uj,∗ > 0, if:
(i) the “normal” (percentage) wage gap b w ≡ wB
wA is strictly lower than the “nor-












(ii) both the “normal” wage and the “normal” rate of return are strictly lower in























By following the same steps as for Proposition 2, the term [1] is now positive











Hence, a necessary condition for the previous inequality to hold is:
b w < b R
since τ < h.
By using inequality (15) and the same steps as in Proposition 2, it is easy to
show that the term [2] is certainly negative if (and only if):
R
A b wτa
j (τ b R − 1)
| {z }
[A]
< (1 − hb w)
| {z }
[B]
A suﬃcient condition such that the previous inequality holds is that term [A]
is negative and term [B] is positive, which occurs respectively if:




hb w < 1 ⇒ b w <
1
h




< b R <
1
τ
and b w <
1
h
30C Proof of Proposition 1
Proof.












where WR ≡ RAw
j
1 + wA and WNR = τRBw
j
1 + f wB.
















[(1 − γ)τ + γ]
Notice that, since γ is a probability, then h is a linear combination between
τ (which is lower than 1) and 1. Hence, the fraction on the right-hand-side is
certainly lower than 1.









is suﬃcient to assure that Uj,∗ is increasing in aj.
D Categories of irregular aliens deﬁning an “il-
legal migrant” in the survey
The observational unit of the survey — generally deﬁned “illegal immigrant” —
is identiﬁed according to the legal status of the immigrants and in our study we
consider the following four categories:
1. individuals applying for asylum or refugee status, i.e.:
• individuals under temporary protection for humanitarian aid;
31• individuals that should be repatriated to a country where they would
be persecuted for reasons concerning race, gender, language, religion,
opinions, citizenship, personal or social condition or that would be repa-
triated to a country where they would not be protected from prosecu-
tion (the Italian reference in the law is: ex art.19, 1◦ comma, D.lgs.
no.286/98);
2. individuals waiting for a rejection decree with accompaniment to the closest
border; the rejection decree is usually issued by the local police authority
(Questore) to an individual that arrived in Italy avoiding border controls
and that was stopped immediately after her/his arrival;
3. individuals waiting for an expulsion decree: the decree is issued by the local
administrative authority (Prefetto) when the migrant avoided border controls
and was not yet rejected;
4. clandestine migrants, i.e. a foreigner with an expired (or no) visa that has
been in Italian territory for no longer than 6 months and that is present in
typical migrant meeting points, like “soup kitchens”, orientation activities
provided by voluntaries and NGOs, etc.
32E
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